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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This matter is before this court on an appeal from an 
order for summary judgment entered in favor of the 
employer in this employment discrimination action. The 
appellant Charles Jones instituted this case against his 
former employer, the School District of Philadelphia, 
pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title 
VII"), 42 U.S.C. SS 2000e et seq., the Pennsylvania Human 
Relations Act ("PHRA"), Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, SS 951 et seq., 
(West 1991), and 42 U.S.C. S 1981. The school district 
employed Jones as a teacher from 1985 to 1995, certified 
to teach physics, chemistry, biology and other subjects. 
Jones resigned from the school district effective June 30, 
1995. According to Jones, he resigned because school 
district personnel informed him that he would be 
terminated involuntarily unless he did so. Jones, an 
African-American, then filed this lawsuit, alleging race 
discrimination and retaliation by the school district. We set 
forth the background of the matter at some length as the 
case is intensely fact driven. 
 
Jones's first assignment in the school district was in the 
science department at Northeast High School ("NEHS") 
where he taught physical science, chemistry, and physics. 
Jones remained at NEHS until March 1993, when the 
school district transferred him to George Washington High 
School ("GWHS"). In addition to his teaching responsibilities 
at NEHS, Jones served as the boys' varsity soccer coach 
from 1985 to the time of his transfer. Jones applied for the 
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position of girls' soccer coach in January 1993, but NEHS 
chose another teacher for that position. 
 
As early as the first year of Jones's assignment to NEHS, 
Principal Francis Hoban began to receive complaints from 
Jones's students that he was "hostile" in class. Hoban 
testified at his deposition that several students objected to 
the way that Jones "talked down" to his students. In 
addition, students and parents complained to Hoban that 
Jones's grading policy was too strict, leading Hoban to 
indicate to Jones that his grading policy was "unrealistic," 
and resulted in disproportionately large numbers of 
failures. 
 
Hoban disciplined Jones several times during his 
employment at NEHS because of student and parent 
complaints and other incidents. At his deposition, Hoban 
characterized "formal disciplinary action" against a teacher 
as taking essentially one of two forms: (1) a memorandum 
directed from school administration to the teacher setting 
forth the nature of the teacher's unsatisfactory conduct, or 
(2) an "SEH-204," which is an "anecdotal record" and is 
viewed as a more severe form of reprimand. A teacher could 
receive an SEH-204 reprimand for an unsatisfactory 
classroom evaluation or for other conduct that an 
administrator considered unacceptable. Jones believes that 
for the most part the disciplinary actions taken against him 
were improper or unwarranted, and that his comments 
often were misunderstood. Moreover, he asserts that Hoban 
repeatedly targeted him for harassment because of his race. 
 
The school district's disciplinary actions against Jones 
included several memoranda on a variety of issues, at least 
two SEH-204s based upon unsatisfactory classroom 
evaluations, and several SEH-204s pertaining to other 
unsatisfactory conduct. For example, Hoban issued several 
memoranda to Jones regarding problems students, parents 
and staff encountered in connection with Jones's 
responsibilities as the varsity soccer team coach. In 
addition, Hoban issued memoranda to Jones concerning 
his teaching style and complaints from students and 
parents on this point. Jones also received memoranda from 
administrators regarding his failure to meet with parents of 
students in his class upon request and his failure to attend 
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a parents' conference on November 17, 1992. Finally, Jones 
received a memorandum from NEHS Assistant Principal 
Lowman in January 1993 regarding an incident between 
Jones and NEHS guidance counselor Nick Tancredi in 
which Tancredi alleged that Jones became abusive. 
 
Jones also received a number of SEH-204s during his 
employment at NEHS. The first appears to have been sent 
in 1991, and concerned several complaints of parents and 
teachers regarding his grading policy and allegedly hostile 
attitude towards his students. Jones was issued another 
SEH-204 in January 1992 as a result of a verbal altercation 
between him and Ernest Davis, a school district 
supervisory employee. Davis accused Jones of calling him 
an "ass" and a "horse's ass" in response to a discussion 
between them concerning the safety of Jones's field house 
locker room office. 
 
Hoban gave Jones another SEH-204 in December 1992 
that documented an unsatisfactory classroom evaluation. 
Hoban stated in the record of the observation that Jones 
had little interaction with the students and that his tone of 
voice was "harsh." Hoban also indicated that he observed 
very little instruction, and that Jones's method of lecture 
was inappropriate in a lab subject such as physics. Hoban 
instructed Jones to engage in the following actions: (1) turn 
lesson plans into the department head each week which 
detail course objectives and student lab work; (2) get 
students involved in the program; (3) turn in cut slips for 
students; (4) contact parents of students performing poorly 
in class; and (5) contact parents of students on the student 
roll but not attending class. 
 
Jones received a second unsatisfactory classroom 
evaluation in February 1993, again in the form of an SEH- 
204. By the time of this evaluation, Hoban already had 
informed Jones of his intention to recommend his transfer 
to another school. 
 
The final matter leading to the school district's transfer of 
Jones from NEHS appears to have occurred in or about 
January 1993. Hoban and Assistant Principal Lowman sent 
Jones memoranda directing him to meet with a parent of 
one of Jones's students. Apparently, the student was failing 
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Jones's physics class, and his mother wanted to meet with 
Jones to discuss the situation. When the mother arrived, 
Jones refused to meet with her without union 
representation at the meeting. Thereafter, Hoban directed 
Jones to meet with the student's mother but he again 
refused to do so. According to Jones, on the advice of his 
union representative he refused to meet any parent without 
union representation. Jones explained that he was fearful 
for his safety in view of prior incidents in which a parent 
and a student had threatened him. 
 
As a result of Jones's conduct, Hoban issued him an 
SEH-204, characterizing his failure to meet with the mother 
as insubordinate in the circumstances. Hoban stated that 
the mother attempted to contact Jones on several occasions 
to schedule a meeting, but that Jones never responded to 
her requests or notes. Hoban recommended that Jones be 
suspended and administratively transferred from NEHS as 
a result of the incident. In March 1993, Frank Guido, the 
regional superintendent for the school district, upheld the 
transfer recommendation. 
 
In fact, the school district transferred Jones to GWHS in 
April 1993 on "special assignment" for the remainder of the 
1992-93 school year. During the summer of 1993, the 
administrators required Jones to list five alternatives for his 
placement for the 1993-94 school year. Jones chose GWHS 
in the hope that he could teach physics there. 
 
Sam Karlin, the new science department head for GWHS 
for the 1993-94 school year, was responsible for assigning 
rosters to teachers in his department. Karlin assigned the 
physics roster for the 1993-94 school year to a white 
woman. On the first day of school, Jones learned that he 
was not assigned the physics roster, and he went to see 
Karlin to discuss the issue. 
 
Jones states in his affidavit that he told Karlin that he 
should have received the physics roster because the teacher 
selected was not certified to teach the class. Jones claims 
that Karlin refused to change the assignment of the physics 
roster, and ignored what Jones told him. Thereafter, Jones 
brought the issue to the attention of Assistant Principal 
Alvin Vaughn and Principal Harry Gutelius, but both 
indicated that they would "stand by" Karlin's decision. 
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Sometime during the fall of the 1993-94 school year, 
Karlin received a telephone call from a parent of one of 
Jones's students alleging that Jones threatened to hit his 
students with a baseball bat. Specifically, the parent stated 
that when a student threw a piece of paper at Jones he 
responded in the following manner: 
 
       If I find out who threw that paper I'll kick your ass. I'll 
       hit you in self defense if I have to. If I have to bring in 
       a baseball bat I will. I had a problem in another school 
       with a girl there and there was a court case. I have the 
       district attorney's number and I won't hesitate to use 
       it. 
 
Jones states in his affidavit that he remembers stating only 
that he would defend himself "if necessary," and then 
asked, "do I need to bring in a baseball to protect myself." 
 
Karlin reported the call to Assistant Principal Vaughn, 
who investigated the matter by interviewing students and 
meeting with Jones and his union representative. As a 
result of the investigation, Vaughn issued Jones an SEH- 
204, and recommended to Gutelius that Jones be 
suspended for five days without pay and administratively 
transferred from GWHS. 
 
In addition to the episode involving the threat, Vaughn 
recommended Jones's transfer based upon his continued 
"exercise of poor judgment, and failure to adhere to school 
district policies and procedures." In reaching his 
conclusion, Vaughn relied upon the information he 
gathered during his investigation, various memoranda from 
Karlin to Jones, as well as an SEH-204 dated January 6, 
1993, from Principal Hoban. Gutelius also recommended 
Jones's transfer after considering Vaughn's SEH-204. The 
school district approved Jones's transfer to Edison High- 
Fareira Skills Center ("Edison") in or about the spring of 
1994. Nevertheless, Jones was not transferred immediately 
from GWHS after the incident. 
 
Jones was assigned to Edison, which has a reputation of 
being a difficult school, for the 1994-95 school year. Jones 
states that on the first day of classes, Vice Principal Kinder 
conducted a classroom observation of him. Jones's union 
representative testified that generally speaking,"from the 
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federation's point of view," a classroom observation on the 
first day of school would be unusual and inappropriate 
given the fact that the first day of classes is a hectic time 
for both teachers and students. 
 
In or around the fall of 1994, Jones made a comment to 
his students during class allegedly in response to a 
student's conduct in defacing school desks in Jones's 
presence. Jones states in his affidavit that he used words 
to the effect that the students should not deface the school 
because it was built for the Puerto Rican community. 
Arturo Velazquez, one of Jones's students, indicated that he 
was offended by the remarks. Jones then asked Velazquez 
to remain after class so that they could speak, and at the 
conclusion of class, Jones escorted Velazquez into a vacant 
adjoining room. 
 
The remainder of what occurred during Jones's 
encounter with Velazquez is in dispute. Jones claims that 
almost immediately Velazquez pushed him against afile 
cabinet and grabbed him in a headlock. Jones states that 
he attempted to wrestle Velazquez off his neck and torso, 
and that in doing so, his hand "could" have touched the 
student's face. In contrast, Velazquez told administrators 
that Jones punched him on the left eye and jaw, and threw 
him on the floor. Velazquez stated that he did not initiate 
any physical contact with Jones. 
 
Principal Raul Torres investigated the incident by 
interviewing Jones, Velazquez, and other students in the 
class at the time of Jones's comments about the Puerto 
Rican community. As a result of the investigation, Torres 
determined that Jones punched Velazquez without 
provocation and made inaccurate and racist comments 
which precipitated the event. Torres issued Jones an SEH- 
204 which recommended his dismissal based upon the 
assault, his prior record of using profanity in addressing 
students in the classroom, and his prior use of implied 
threats to harm students. Jones, however, resigned from 
the school district as of June 30, 1995, and thus the school 
district did not directly discharge him. 
 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
After filing administrative complaints with the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission and the Equal 
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Employment Opportunity Commission in 1993 and 1994 
respectively, Jones received a right to sue letter from the 
EEOC dated January 14, 1997. He then filed his complaint 
in the district court on April 17, 1997. 
 
In his complaint, Jones alleged the following claims: (1) a 
disparate treatment race discrimination claim under Title 
VII and the PHRA based upon his administrative transfer 
from NEHS to GWHS; (2) a disparate treatment race 
discrimination claim under Title VII and the PHRA based 
upon the decisions to deny him the physics roster and 
transfer him to Edison; (3) a disparate treatment race 
discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. S 1981 based on his 
forced resignation; and (4) retaliation claims under Title VII, 
the PHRA, and section 1981 based upon each of those 
events. His complaint also mentions the fact that he was 
denied the position of girls' soccer coach shortly before his 
transfer in April 1993 to GWHS. Nevertheless, it appears 
from his brief that he does not challenge that decision as 
constituting an adverse employment action in and of itself; 
instead, he apparently cites this action as evidence that 
Hoban treated him differently because of his race. 
 
The school district filed a motion for summary judgment 
that the district court granted by memorandum and order. 
See Jones v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 19 F. Supp.2d 414 
(E.D. Pa. 1998). Jones filed a motion for reconsideration, 
which the district court denied by order entered November 
10, 1998. Jones then filed this timely appeal. While the 
notice of appeal recites that it is from the order of 
November 10, 1998, effectively the appeal is from the 
summary judgment as well and we are deciding the case on 
that basis. See Williams v. Guzzardi, 875 F.2d 46, 49 (3d 
Cir. 1989). 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
On this appeal, we review the district court's grant of 
summary judgment de novo. See Nelson v. Upsala College, 
51 F.3d 383, 385 (3d Cir. 1995). Summary judgment is 
proper where the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits show there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is 
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entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c). In deciding the motion, we view the record in the 
light most favorable to Jones and resolve all reasonable 
inferences in his favor. See Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 
F.3d 138, 142 n.3 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc). We do not 
distinguish between the claims under federal and 
Pennsylvania law in our disposition of the case as we agree 
with Jones's contention that the standards are the same for 
purposes of determining the summary judgment motion. 
See Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
While Jones's brief is complex, we discern that his 
primary contentions on appeal are: (1) the district court 
erroneously concluded that his only claim was a claim of 
constructive discharge, thereby misapplying the elements of 
a prima facie case under Title VII and the PHRA; (2) the 
district court erred in resolving factual issues in the school 
district's favor in violation of the standard applied at 
summary judgment proceedings; (3) the district court 
improperly discounted Jones's direct evidence of Hoban's 
discriminatory animus, as well as evidence that showed 
that he systematically mistreated Jones during his 
employment at NEHS; (4) the district court ignored the 
inference of discrimination which arises from Jones's 
evidence that similarly situated white teachers were treated 
more favorably than Jones; (5) the district court 
erroneously applied the test for determining whether Jones 
was constructively discharged; (6) the district court 
improperly dismissed Jones's retaliation claim because it 
found that the relevant decisionmakers had no knowledge 
of his prior EEO activity and determined that there was 
insufficient evidence of retaliatory motive to survive a 
motion for summary judgment. Jones asks us to reverse 
the district court's disposition of the matter and remand 
the case for trial. 
 
A. Disparate treatment claims under Title VII, section 1981, 
       and the PHRA 
 
The parties do not dispute that Jones's disparate 
treatment race discrimination claims under Title VII, 
section 1981, and the PHRA require application of the 
familiar burden-shifting framework the Supreme Court 
articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 
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792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824 (1973). While Jones's brief 
refers to what he considers to be "direct evidence" of 
Hoban's discriminatory intent, it does not appear that he is 
attempting to proceed under a mixed motive theory and, in 
any event, such an analysis would not be appropriate in 
this case. Briefly summarized, the McDonnell Douglas 
analysis proceeds in three stages. First, the plaintiff must 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination. If the 
plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, the 
burden shifts to the defendant "to articulate some 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's 
rejection." Id. Finally, should the defendant carry this 
burden, the plaintiff then must have an opportunity to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its 
true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination. See 
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 
252-53, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093 (1981) (citations omitted). 
While the burden of production may shift, "[t]he ultimate 
burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant 
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at 
all times with the plaintiff." Id. Our experience is that most 
cases turn on the third stage, i.e., can the plaintiff establish 
pretext. 
 
The parties raise several issues pertaining to the proper 
analysis of Jones's prima facie case of discrimination, as 
well as the sufficiency of his evidence of pretext. The 
district court dismissed Jones's disparate treatment claims 
on two separate bases: (1) he failed to satisfy the third 
element of his prima facie case; and (2) there was 
insufficient evidence calling into question the legitimacy of 
the school district's proffered reasons for its adverse 
employment decisions. 
 
1. Prima facie case analysis 
 
Citing our decisions in Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de 
Nemours and Co., 100 F.3d 1061 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc), 
and Waldron v. S.L. Industries, Inc., 56 F.3d 491 (3d Cir. 
1995), the district court stated that a prima facie case is 
established when a plaintiff shows the following: (1) "that 
he is a member of a protected class"; (2) that he"is 
qualified for the position"; (3) that he "was either not hired 
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or fired from that position"; (4) "under circumstances that 
give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination such as 
might occur when the position is filled by a person not of 
the protected class." Jones, 19 F. Supp.2d at 418 
(emphasis added). The district court stated that elements 
one, two and four arguably were satisfied, but that element 
three was not because the record reflected that Jones 
resigned and thus was not fired. Id. at 418-19. From that 
conclusion, the district court stated that it was required to 
"determine whether or not [Jones's] resignation amounted 
to a constructive discharge," and proceeded to an analysis 
of that point, holding that it did not. Id. at 419-20 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
The court then went on to hold that "even assuming 
arguendo, that [Jones] has made out a prima facie case, he 
has produced no evidence to rebut or show that the 
reasons articulated by the School District for his 
termination are a pretext for discrimination." Id. at 420. 
Consequently, the court determined that on this ground as 
well as Jones's failure to make a prima facie case, the 
school district was entitled to summary judgment. 
 
Jones asserts that the district court's analysis 
oversimplified the matter, as the court did not recognize 
that his complaint asserted claims against the school 
district based on adverse employment decisions during his 
employment rather than merely on his termination. Jones 
contends that these claims are distinct from his claim of 
constructive discharge in 1995. 
 
We agree with Jones's position on this point, as the 
complaint clearly delineated the factual basis for his Title 
VII and PHRA claims, and a review of that pleading 
confirms that he did not predicate his claims solely on the 
alleged constructive discharge. Indeed, Jones pleaded the 
constructive discharge claim only under 42 U.S.C.S 1981. 
In fact, Jones's complaint challenged not only the 
purported constructive discharge, but also the transfers 
and the denial of the assignment to him of the physics 
roster at GWHS. 
 
The district court's error seems to have stemmed from its 
borrowing of language from cases which recited the 
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necessary elements of a prima facie case where the 
challenged employment decision is a termination. See 
Sheridan, 100 F.3d at 1066 n.5 (noting elements which are 
required to establish a prima facie case of "discriminatory 
discharge"); Waldron, 56 F.3d at 494 (same). Rather than 
considering the possibility that the constructive discharge 
claim was but one of Jones's claims arising out of his 
employment relationship with the school district, the court 
turned its attention to the constructive discharge analysis 
because Jones admittedly had not been terminated directly 
so as to satisfy the third element of a prima facie case as 
articulated in Sheridan and Waldron. Compare Sheridan, 
100 F.3d at 1063, 1072-75 (count I of plaintiff 's complaint 
alleged a failure to promote claim under Title VII and count 
III alleged a claim of constructive discharge; court 
considered sufficiency of evidence presented on each claim 
separately). 
 
We often have remarked that the elements of a prima 
facie case depend on the facts of the particular case. See, 
e.g., Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys. Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 352 (3d 
Cir. 1999); Torre v. Casio, Inc., 42 F.3d 825, 830 (3d Cir. 
1994). Thus, a prima facie case cannot be established on a 
one-size-fits-all basis. In fact, the relevant question with 
respect to Jones's Title VII and PHRA claims is whether he 
suffered some form of "adverse employment action" 
sufficient to evoke the protection of Title VII and the PHRA. 
See Connors v. Chrysler Fin. Corp., 160 F.3d 971, 974 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (stating that third element of prima facie case in 
disparate treatment ADEA case is that plaintiff suffered an 
adverse employment action); Deane, 142 F.3d at 142 (same 
under ADA); Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, 142 F.3d 639, 644 
n.5 (3d Cir. 1998) (same under ADEA); Lawrence v. National 
Westminster Bank, 98 F.3d 61, 66 (3d Cir. 1996) (same). 
Obviously, something less than a discharge could be an 
adverse employment action. 
 
We have held that employment decisions such as 
transfers and demotions may suffice to establish the third 
element of a plaintiff 's prima facie case. See, e.g., Torre, 42 
F.3d at 831 n.7 (recognizing that a job transfer, even 
without loss of pay or benefits, may, in some 
circumstances, constitute an adverse job action); see also 
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McGrenaghan v. St. Denis Sch., 979 F. Supp. 323, 326 
(E.D. Pa. 1997) (same). Here, Jones challenges both 
administrative transfers and the denial of the physics 
roster. As a result of the first transfer, he lost his 
opportunity to teach physics, which clearly was the subject 
he sought most to teach. After Jones chose to remain at 
GWHS because of the possibility that he would be awarded 
the physics roster, he learned that he was passed over for 
that position. Instead, the administration assigned Jones to 
teach what he regarded as less desirable science classes. 
 
Moreover, the transfer from GWHS to Edison landed 
Jones in a placement which had a reputation of being a 
"difficult school." Viewing the facts in the light most 
favorable to Jones, they suffice to demonstrate that Jones 
was subjected to sufficient adverse employment actions 
such that his Title VII and PHRA claims should have 
survived the initial stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. 
See Torre, 42 F.3d at 831 n.7 (plaintiff 's transfer to "dead- 
end" job was sufficient to support plaintiff 's prima facie 
case); see also DiIenno v. Goodwill Indus., 162 F.3d 235, 
236 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding in context of retaliation claim 
that transfer could constitute adverse employment action 
as viewed from plaintiff 's perspective). 
 
Finally, we conclude that the district court erred in 
granting summary judgment to the school district on 
Jones's constructive discharge claim under section 1981 on 
its theory that he failed to establish a prima facie case. In 
Goss v. Exxon Office Systems Co., 747 F.2d 885 (3d Cir. 
1984), we recognized that an involuntary transfer to a less 
desirable position could support a claim of constructive 
discharge, especially where the surrounding circumstances 
indicate a pattern of discriminatory treatment. Id. at 888- 
89. Thus, we affirmed the trial court's findings that the 
plaintiff had been constructively discharged where she 
presented evidence that she was involuntarily transferred 
after her supervisor questioned her ability to combine a 
career with motherhood. At the prima facie case stage of 
the analysis, we merely determine whether a plaintiff has 
presented sufficient evidence so that we should consider a 
defendant's proffered reasons for its decision and, if the 
defendant has presented reasons, the plaintiff 's evidence of 
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pretext. Viewed under that lens and in the light most 
favorable to Jones, he should have withstood summary 
judgment on that aspect of his constructive discharge 
claim, because his involuntary transfer to two schools and 
the second school's failure to assign him the physics roster 
despite his qualifications, was sufficient to establish a 
prima facie case under section 1981. 
 
2. Pretext analysis 
 
We turn now to the second and third steps of the 
McDonnell Douglas tripartite framework. The second stage 
requires the defendant to articulate a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment 
action at issue. Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 
1101, 1108 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc). Jones does not appear 
to contest that the school district satisfied its burden of 
production in this regard and plainly it did. 
 
Once the defendant has satisfied its burden of production 
at the second stage of the McDonnell Douglas tripartite 
framework, a court's analysis turns to the third andfinal 
aspect of the inquiry which, as we have indicated, is 
usually the determinative stage of the case. At this point, 
the court focuses on whether there is sufficient evidence 
from which a jury could conclude that the purported 
reasons for defendant's adverse employment actions were in 
actuality a pretext for intentional race discrimination. At 
trial, the plaintiff must convince the finder of fact "both that 
the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real 
reason." St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515, 
113 S.Ct. 2742, 2752 (1993) (emphasis in original). The 
factfinder's rejection of the employer's proffered reason 
allows, but does not compel, judgment for the plaintiff. 
Sheridan, 100 F.3d at 1066-67. 
 
On numerous occasions, we have explained the plaintiff 's 
burden at summary judgment on this aspect of the 
McDonnell Douglas tripartite framework. Specifically, in 
Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 1994), and later in 
Sheridan, we stated that a plaintiff may defeat a motion for 
summary judgment (or judgment as a matter of law) by 
pointing "to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from 
which a factfinder would reasonably either: (1) disbelieve 
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the employer's articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe 
that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely 
than not a motivating or determinative cause of the 
employer's action." Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764; Sheridan, 100 
F.3d at 1067. 
 
We recently characterized this final aspect of the 
McDonnell Douglas analysis as comprised of two alternatives 
as articulated by Fuentes and Sheridan . See Keller, 130 
F.3d at 1108. In Keller, we explained that to satisfy the first 
prong of the Fuentes/Sheridan standard, 
 
       the plaintiff cannot simply show that the employer's 
       decision was wrong or mistaken, since the factual 
       dispute at issue is whether discriminatory animus 
       motivated the employer, not whether the employer is 
       wise, shrewd, prudent or competent. Rather, the 
       nonmoving plaintiff must demonstrate such 
       weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, 
       incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's 
       proffered legitimate reasons for its actions that a 
       reasonable factfinder could rationally find them 
       unworthy of credence. 
 
Id. at 1108-09. Then we indicated that a plaintiff may 
satisfy this standard by demonstrating, through admissible 
evidence, that the employer's articulated reason was not 
merely wrong, but that it was "so plainly wrong that it 
cannot have been the employer's real reason." Id. at 1109. 
 
Under the Fuentes/Sheridan inquiry, the plaintiff also 
may survive summary judgment by pointing to evidence in 
the record which "allows the fact finder to infer that 
discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or 
determinative cause of the adverse employment action." 
Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764. In Simpson, we provided the 
following explanation of this prong: "For example, the 
plaintiff may show that the employer has previously 
discriminated against [the plaintiff], that the employer has 
previously discriminated against other persons within the 
plaintiff 's protected class, or that the employer has treated 
more favorably similarly situated persons not within the 
protected class." Simpson, 142 F.3d at 645 (citing Fuentes, 
32 F.3d at 765). 
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The district court in its determination that even if Jones 
had established a prima facie case of discrimination in his 
termination, stated that he "produced no evidence aside 
from his own testimony that the actions directed against 
him by the school district were racially motivated." Jones, 
19 F. Supp.2d at 420. Jones challenges that ruling, arguing 
that the court erred in dismissing his disparate treatment 
claims by ignoring circumstantial evidence favorable to this 
claim and failing to recognize that he raised many factual 
issues that would allow a jury to find that the school 
district's proffered reasons for transferring plaintiff twice 
and denying him the physics roster were unworthy of 
credence. 
 
Jones's brief focuses principally upon his employment at 
NEHS and his transfer from that school. Nevertheless, he 
also addresses the other adverse employment actions he 
has suffered, claiming that each constitutes a violation of 
Title VII and the PHRA. Consequently, we have made a 
complete study of the record of this case to determine 
whether there is sufficient evidence from which a jury could 
conclude that the school district's purported reasons for its 
adverse employment actions were a pretext for 
discrimination. While we do not set forth all of the evidence 
and explain our analysis of it, we have concluded that there 
is insufficient evidence to support the claim of pretext. In 
this regard, we point out that Jones makes numerous 
allegations in his affidavit which he predicates on nothing 
more than his beliefs without having actual knowledge of 
them. In fact, a careful analysis of the record demonstrates 
that many of his allegations simply are not supported. 
Moreover, Jones minimizes the baseball bat matter as 
merely "a minor classroom incident." Br. at 3. We think it 
clear that a school district hardly can tolerate comments 
from a teacher even to disruptive students that he will use 
a baseball bat on them. 
 
Overall, the circumstances of this case which we already 
have described in detail reflect a situation in which the 
employer should have been able to take adverse 
employment actions against the employee without fear of 
being embroiled in an expensive law suit. While Jones may 
quarrel with the school district's conclusions regarding 
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particular controversies, the bona fides of its 
determinations simply cannot be doubted. Thus, though we 
view Jones's claims as broader than the district court 
recognized, we are in complete agreement with its 
conclusion that he presented no evidence from which a jury 
could conclude that the school district's articulated reasons 
for its adverse employment actions were a pretext for 
discrimination. See Jones, 19 F. Supp.2d at 420. 
Consequently, we will affirm the summary judgment 
against Jones on his disparate treatment race 
discrimination claims under Title VII and the PHRA. 
 
As we have indicated, in addition to bringing Title VII and 
PHRA race discrimination claims, Jones has brought a 
claim under 42 U.S.C. S 1981 premised upon his eventual 
decision to resign from his employment with the school 
district. In particular, his complaint states that his 
"involuntary resignation" was the result of the 
discriminatory and retaliatory treatment he experienced at 
Edison, including being threatened with removal for 
allegedly striking a student while another employee in a 
similar incident was not disciplined in any manner. Jones 
alleges that the ultimatum amounted to a constructive 
discharge, and further that the evidence shows that the 
proffered reasons for the ultimatum are unworthy of 
credence. 
 
The school district's proffered legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for giving Jones the ultimatum of 
resigning or facing termination was primarily that Jones 
was involved in a physical altercation with one of his 
students in which he struck and injured the student 
without provocation. Edison principal Raul Torres stated 
that he also recommended Jones's discharge based upon 
his "prior record of using profanity in addressing students 
in the classroom as well has having made implied threats 
to use physical harm to students at GWHS." 
 
The school district first maintains that the district court 
properly dismissed the section 1981 claim because the 
Supreme Court in Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, 
491 U.S. 701, 735, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 2723 (1989), held that 
the exclusive federal damages remedy against a state actor 
for violation of that section is under 42 U.S.C.S 1983. The 
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school district contends that because Jones brought his 
constructive discharge claim under the wrong statute, the 
district court properly dismissed his claim. This argument 
implicates an issue regarding the amendment of section 
1981 by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 
S 101(c), 105 Stat. 1071, 1072 (1991), i.e., did the 1991 act 
overturn the Jett ruling that the exclusive federal damages 
remedy against a state actor for a section 1981 violation is 
under section 1983. See Federation of African Am. 
Contractors v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 
1996); see also Hopp v. City of Pittsburgh, 194 F.3d 434, 
1999 WL 825457, at *4 (3d Cir. Oct. 14, 1999); see, 
however, Dennis v. County of Fairfax, 55 F.3d 151, 156 n.1 
(4th Cir. 1995). 
 
The school district next argues that assuming arguendo 
that we would overlook Jones's failure to present the 
section 1981 claim under section 1983, dismissal was 
appropriate nonetheless because the standards governing 
Jones's Title VII and PHRA claims control his constructive 
discharge claim, and there is insufficient evidence 
demonstrating that its proffered reasons for demanding his 
resignation were a pretext for illegal race discrimination. 
Finally, the school district claims that to the extent that 
Jones predicates his section 1981 claim upon a theory of 
racial harassment, his proofs fail to satisfy thefive-part test 
set for in our opinion in Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 
895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 
We find it unnecessary to consider the Jett  issue as we 
are satisfied that a review of the evidence proffered in 
connection with Jones's section 1981 claim demonstrates 
that it is insufficient to establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the decision to request plaintiff 's resignation 
was motivated by racial bias. Therefore, we will affirm the 
district court's order for summary judgment on this claim 
as well. 
 
B. The retaliation claims under Title VII, section 1981, and 
       the PHRA 
 
Finally, we address Jones's retaliation claims. The district 
court granted the school district summary judgment on 
these retaliation claims, finding that there "was absolutely 
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no evidence on the record before us that the [school 
district's] actions against [Jones] were in retaliation for his 
filing of EEO complaints." Jones, 19 F. Supp.2d at 421. The 
district court also concluded that with respect to Jones's 
allegations of retaliation by Principal Hoban, "the record 
reflects that [Jones] made no EEO filings until after Hoban 
recommended, and the school district upheld, his 
recommendation for Jones's administrative transfer." Id. 
(emphasis added). Finally, the district court found that 
Jones "produce[d] no evidence which could in any way be 
construed as showing any knowledge on the part of either 
Principal Gutelius or Principal Torres of [Jones's] previous 
EEO filings." Id. On this appeal, Jones apparently is 
attempting to expand his claims by arguing that the 
retaliation was in part for his opposing racial 
discrimination. The school district contends that this 
expansion is improper. 
 
After a careful review, we are satisfied that the district 
court reached the correct result on the retaliation claims. 
While it is true that the school district took a series of 
adverse employment actions against Jones, it is clear that 
it took the actions in response to Jones's ongoing 
unacceptable conduct rather than because he filed 
complaints under Title VII or the PHRA or opposed racial 
discrimination. Consequently, we will affirm on this point 
without further discussion. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the order for summary 
judgment entered October 9, 1998, and the order denying 
reconsideration entered November 10, 1998, will be 
affirmed. 
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